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A. INTRODUCTION
Leo Olztik was an 88-year-old man with dementia, congestive heart failure, and kidney
problems when his wife and son found him jumping out of bed and ripping off his clothes. 1 His
family brought him to the hospital, which placed him in the hospice unit, where he passed away
comfortably after eight days, in a sedated state induced by an IV drip of morphine and a strong
sedative? After three days of failed efforts to ease Mr. Olztik's agitation with oral medication,
the doctors ordered that the drugs be administered through an IV. 3 The doctors knew that the
drugs would decrease his heart rate and slow his breathing. On the sixth day, Mrs. Olztik and
her children met with doctors and nurses to discuss their options. 4 Ultimately the family decided
that it was best to continue the sedation without artificial nutrition and hydration because they
felt that it would burden his system. 5
The form of care Mr. Olztik received is called terminal sedation.

The name is

misleading, as it is not intended to cause death; it is intended to relieve suffering and distress that
may be present during the final days of life. 6 This paper argues that terminal sedation is a legal
form of care necessary for use as a last resort when all other forms of providing comfort in the
final days have failed. Terminal sedation is controversial.
Opponents and critics of terminal sedation believe that terminal sedation that involves

Anemona Hartocollis, Hard Choices for a Comfortable Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009,
http://www.nvtimes.com/2009/12/27 /health/27sedation.html?pagewanted=all& r=O.
2 /d.
3 /d.
4 /d.
5 /d.
6 David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing
Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 94 7 (1997).
.
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discontinuation of feeding is indistinguishable from euthanasia. 7 Distinguishing between legal
treatment withdrawal and palliative care on the one hand, and illegal euthanasia on the other
hand has become an increasing challenge. Adding to the complexity is that four states, Oregon, 8
Washington, 9 Vermont, 10 and Montana, 11 have legalized physician-assisted suicide, which
involves a physician facilitating a patient's death by providing a patient the means, a
prescription, and information on the lethal dose while aware that the patient intends to end his
life. 12 In sum, it is legal to honor a competent patient's 13 request to withdraw or withhold lifesustaining treatment. 14 It is illegal to connect an IV to a person to infuse drugs intended to
hasten death. It is legal to connect an IV to a person with the intent to relieve pain, and to
increase the dose enough to induce a sedated state, even if death is foreseeable. 15 And so the
question becomes on which side of the line is terminal sedation that involves withholding
nutrition and hydration.
The Supreme Court of the United States unanimously upheld the power of a state to
criminalize physician-assisted suicide and held that there is no fundamental right to hasten one's
own death. 16 The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the issue of terminal sedation. In

/d.
Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. 127.800 (1998).
9 Wash. Rev. Code. Ch. 70.245 (2008).
10 Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act, 18 V.S.A. Ch. 113 (2013).
11 Baxter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
12 See Timothy E. Quill, The Graying of America: Challenges and Controversies: Physicians Should ''Assist in
Suicide" When it is Appropriate, 40 J.L. MEO. & ETHICS 57 (2012).
13 If the patient is incompetent, a surrogate decision-maker should be identified. A patient who is incompetent
may have a surrogate decision-maker who will advance their position on life-sustaining treatment. See Alan
Meisel, Lois Snyder & Timothy Quill, Seven Legal Barriers to End-of-Life Care, 284 JAMA 2495, 2496 (2000).
14 "Life-sustaining treatment is any treatment that serves to prolong life without reversing the underlying
medical condition. Life-sustaining treatment may include, but is not limited to, mechanical ventilation, renal
dialysis, chemotherapy, antibiotics, and artificial nutrition and hydration." Am. Med. Assoc., Opinion 2.20Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, AMA CODE OF ETHICS, http:/ fwww.amaassn.orgjamafpub/physician-resourcesjmedical-ethicsjcode-medical-ethicsjopinion220.page.
15 Quill, supra note 12, at 59 (A patient with the capacity to make decisions or a surrogate decision-maker
must consent prior to initiation).
16 See generally Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
7
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the companion cases Washington v. Glucksberg 17 and Vacca v. Qui/118 the concurring opinions
of Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, and Stevens indicate support of terminal
sedation.

The majority opinions, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, affirmed the Court's

assumption that the Due Process Clause protects the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment
and indicate approval of the principle of double effect applied in the context of palliation. This
paper argues that terminal sedation comprises palliation that can be justified pursuant to the
principle of double effect.
This paper will address the topic of terminal sedation by discussing the legal support of
the practice and the ethical controversy. The question that underlies the controversy is whether
terminal sedation is distinct from euthanasia or euthanasia in disguise. The paper begins by
surveying the different forms of terminal sedation and explicating the important basic definitions
at the heart of the differences among euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and terminal
sedation. The discussion of the background law focuses on three important Supreme Court
decisions. The controversy is not just one among scholars but also a moral and ethical dilemma
that physicians, nurses, patients, and their families face.
Terminal sedation is distinct from euthanasia and is the best option for some classes of
patients to allow for equal opportunity to a painless death.
B. TERMINAL SEDATION
Terminal sedation is the induction of an unconscious state to relieve otherwise intractable
distress, frequently accompanied by the withdrawal and withholding of life-sustaining
interventions. 19 Terminal sedation is also commonly referred to as sedation, palliative sedation,

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702.
Quin 521 u.s. 793.
19 See Timothy Quill et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of Voluntarily Stopping Eating and
Drinking, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 278 JAMA 2099 (1997).
17

1a
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end-of-life-sedation, and total sedation. 20 Terminal sedation is a form of palliative care. 21 The
World Health Organization (WHO) defines palliative care as "an approach that improves the
quality of life of patients and their families facing the problems associated with life-threatening
illness, through the prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and
impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, psychosocial, and
spiritual."22 The intent of terminal sedation is not to end the patient's life, but to relieve pain and
suffering despite the possibility that death may result. Terminal sedation is used as a last resort
when alternative means of relieving symptoms have been ineffective or have intolerable adverse
effects. 23
In advanced stages of terminal illness, patients may expenence symptoms that are
considered refractory symptoms; those that are not responsive to traditional pain management
treatments, such as: extreme pain, respiratory distress, persistent vomiting, agitation, restlessness,
and myoclonus. 24 Refractory symptoms have a negative effect on a patient's functioning,
increase as the patient gets closer to death, and interfere with a peaceful dying process. 25
Terminal sedation is appropriate for terminally ill patients as a last resort when other aggressive,
symptom-specific palliative methods have been ineffective for reducing refractory suffering. 26
Terminal sedation is justified when: (1) alternative means of relieving the symptoms are
ineffective or have intolerable adverse effects; (2) the goal or intention is to relieve symptoms,

20

Tatsuya Morita, Satoru Tsuneto & Yasuo Shima, Definition of Sedation for Symptom Relief A Systematic
Literature Review and a Proposal of Operational Criteria, 24 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 447,449 (2002); Patricia
Claessens, Johan Menten, Paul Schotsmans & Bert Broeckaert, Palliative Sedation: A Review of the Research
Literature, 36 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 310 (2008).
.
21 Bernard Lo & Gordon Rubenfeld, Palliative Sedation in Dying Patients, 294 JAMA 1810,1811 (2005).
22 Definition of Palliative Care, WORLD HEALTH ORG., htttp:/ Jwww.who.intjcancerjpalliativejdefinitionjen.
23 Quill et al., supra note 19; Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1812.
24 /d. at 1811.
25 Claessens, Menten, Schotsmans & Broeckaert, supra note 20, at 311.
26

/d.
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not shorten life; and (3) the patient is at the point of death, in a dying state, or close to death. 27
There is opposition to terminal sedation when it is combined with the withdrawing or
withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration? 8 Also controversial is the use of terminal
sedation to treat existential or spiritual suffering as opposed to refractory physical suffering. 29
These controversies will be discussed below.
The use of a variety of terminology to describe the practice of terminal sedation and the
lack of a universally agreed upon definition make researching and analyzing data on terminal
sedation in clinical practice difficult. 30 Terms are used synonymously despite having different
meanings and the variability in classifying and defining terminal sedation creates confusion in
clinical and research areas. 31 The wide variation obscures the frequency of terminal sedation and
the fundamental differences in how sedation of dying patients is used in clinical settings. 32
The term "terminal sedation" was first introduced in 1991. 33 The term was immediately
controversial due to the negative connotation and the possibility of misinterpretation that the
name implies; that the primary aim is termination of life rather than symptom alleviation. 34 One
form of terminal sedation involves the slow drip of morphine; leading to another unfortunate
label, "slow euthanasia." 35 The usage was short-lived and is currently rarely used in the

27

Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1812.

28

/d.

29

/d.
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°Claessens, Menten, Schotsmans & Broeckaert, supra note 20, at 328; Evangelia S. Papavasiliou, Sarah G.

Brearley, Jane E. Seymour, Jayne Brown & Sheila A. Payne. From Sedation to Continuous Sedation Until Death:
How Has the Conceptual Basis of Sedation in End-of-Life Care Changed Over Time? 46 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT.
691,693 (2013).
31 Mohamed Y. Rady & Joseph L. Verheijde, Continuous Deep Sedation Until Death: Palliation or PhysicianAssisted Death? 27 AM. J. HOSPICE & MED. 205, 207(2010).
32 /d. at 207; M. Maltoni et al., Palliative Sedation Therapy Does Not Hasten Death: Results from a Prospective
Multicenter Study, 20 ANNALS ONCOLOGY 1163 (2009).
33 Papavasiliou et al., supra note 30; Robert E. Enck, Drug-induced Terminal Sedation for Symptom Control, 8
AM. J. HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE, 3 (1991).
34 Morita, Tsuneto & Shima, supra note 20.
35 Eric Cassell & Ben Rich, Intractable End-of-Life Suffering and the Ethics of Palliative Sedation, 11 PAIN
MEDICINE 435,436 (2010).
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literature. 36 Another term that has been used is "total sedation" which suggests sedation until
total loss of consciousness or total relief of suffering.
sedation."38

37

A commonly used term is "palliative

Some prefer to use more descriptive terminology. The terms "continuous deep

sedation," "palliative sedation to unconsciousness," "continuous deep sedation until death", and
"continuous sedation until death" have emerged. 39 The most common terms that are used are
"terminal sedation" and "palliative sedation."
In addition to the variation in terminology used, there is disparity in the definitions. The
challenges in achieving a universally accepted definition may account for the lack of conceptual
clarity. 40 Two core factors are incorporated into most definitions: (1) the presence of severe
distress refractory to standard palliative treatment and (2) the use of sedative medication with the
primary intent to relieve distress by reducing consciousness. 41 A proposed definition for
"palliative sedation therapy" is "the use of sedative medications to relieve intolerable and
refractory distress by the reduction of patient consciousness. "42
Rather than using a standard definition, some prefer to describes the practice. However,
when individual researchers or clinicians use descriptive language and then slap on a label, the
description may not match the definition that another clinician or researcher used under the same
label, and the confusion continues to grow. One group of authors accepts terminal sedation to
mean what they describe as "sedation of the imminently dying." 43 Terminal sedation is also used

36

37
38
39

Evangetia S. Papavasiliou et al., supra note 30, at 693.
Morita, Tsuneto & Shima, supra note 20 at 451.
/d.
/d.

40

Evangelia S. Papavasiliou et al., supra note 30, at 692.
Morita, Tsuneto & Shima, supra note 20 at 448.
42 /d. at 452.
43 Lynn A. Jansen & Daniel P. Sulmasy, Sedation, Alimentation, Hydration, and Equivocation: Careful
Conversation about Care at the End of Life, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED., 845 (2002).
41
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to describe a practice described as "sedation toward death. " 44 They describe "sedation of the
imminently dying" as a practice in which: (1) the patient is within "hours, days, or at most a few
weeks from death;" (2) the patient has severe symptoms that are refractory to standard palliative
care; (3) the physician has tried all other possibilities; (4) there is a "dose-dependent side effect
of sedation that is a foreseen but unintended consequence of trying to relieve the patient's
symptoms;" and (5) this therapy may be combined with the withholding or withdrawing of lifesustaining treatments that are ineffective or disproportionately burdensome. 45 The practice of
"sedation toward death" is a practice in which ( 1) the patient does not need to be imminently
dying; (2) the refractory symptoms are the consciousness that one is not dead yet; (3) the
physician selects to render the patient unconscious as a means of treating the refractory
symptom; and (4) other life-sustaining treatments are withdrawn to hasten death. 46 The second
definition is not describing terminal sedation. The second definition is more akin to euthanasia
and is not an acceptable definition of terminal sedation.
Another term used is "proportionate palliative sedation" where the sedation is
systematically increased until sufficient relief of suffering is achieved and the patient may only
be rendered unconscious because lesser doses did not provide sufficient relief.

47

"Palliative

sedation to unconsciousness" is a practice in which the goal from the beginning is to achieve
unconsciousness and often nutrition and hydration are withheld. 48 These two described practices
seem to be similar to "sedation towards death" and "sedation of the imminently dying" but they
have less description. It is difficult to discern if they are the same practice or different forms of
the practice.
/d.
/d.
46 /d.
44
45

47

Quill, supra note 12, at 59.

48

/d.
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For purposes of this paper, the term "terminal sedation" will be used. The analysis will
consider terminal sedation of the terminally ill, terminal sedation of the terminally ill
accompanied by the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, and terminal sedation of the
terminally ill combined with the withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration.
C. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHENASIA
In both physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, the primary intention is to cause the
patient's death. However, euthanasia is illegal in every state whereas physician-assisted suicide
is legal in Oregon49 , Washington50 , Vermont51 , and Montana. 52
Physician-assisted suicide refers to a physician providing a patient with the medical
means, by writing a prescription for a drug, and providing the patient with the knowledge of the
lethal dose. 53 The physician assists by providing the patient with the means, but the patient is the
one who takes the action, taking the medication, to end his own life. 54 The physician is not the
one ending the patient's life, but is still held legally and morally responsible as an accomplice. 55
Patients who choose the option of physician-assisted suicide are "motivated primarily by loss of
autonomy, loss of control of their bodily functions, decreased ability to enjoy life, and tiredness
of dying." 56

49

Oregon Death With Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. 127.800 (1998).
Wash. Rev. Code. Ch. 70.245 (2008).
51 Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act, 18 V.S.A. Ch. 113 (2013).
sz Baxter v. Montana, 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
53 Quilt supra note 12, at 59; AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.211 http:/ jwww.amaassn.org/ jamajpub/physician-resourcesjmedical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2211.page.
54 Quill, supra note 12, at 59.
so

55

/d.

Timothy E. Quill, Dying and Decision Making- Evolution of End-of-Life Options, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029,
2030.

56
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Euthanasia involves the physician administering the agent that will end the patient's
life. 57

A physician is directly responsible for ending the patient's life.

"Euthanasia is

fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as healer." 58 The physician's intent is
causing the patient's death. The patient's death results from the administration of the agent.
Although there is an agent administered in the practice of terminal sedation, the intent is not to
cause to the patients death, only to relieve the patient's suffering. Patients requesting euthanasia
typically do so as a result of a perceived loss of dignity at the end of life; terminal sedation is
typically used to address severe physiological symptoms in dying patients. 59
D. RIGHT TO DIE JURISPRUDENCE SUPPORTS TERMINAL SEDATION
The Supreme Court has unanimously ruled that there is no constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide. 60

Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed

terminal sedation, examination of three "right to die" cases suggests that a ban on terminal
sedation would be unconstitutional. 61
I. CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state caused by injuries that she sustained in
an automobile accident. 62 Nancy was unaware, unresponsive, unable to communicate, and was
kept alive by the artificial feeding and hydration tube inserted in her abdomen. She could have
remained in this state for many years.

Prior to the accident, during a conversation with a

friend/roommate, Nancy purportedly said that if she were unable to live at least halfway

57

AMA Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 2.21 http:/ jwww.ama-assn.orgjamajpub/physicianresourcesjmedical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion221.page.
58 /d.
59 Judith A. C. Rietjens et al., Terminal Sedation and Euthanasia: A Comparison of Clinical Practices, 166
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 749,753.
60 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
61 See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
62 See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 (1990).
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normally, she would not want to continue living. Her co-guardian parents sought to discontinue
the artificial nutrition and hydration that was sustaining her. 63 The hospital refused to do so
without a court order.
The trial court authorized the removal of the life-sustaining treatment upon concluding
that a person in Nancy's position had a fundamental right to refuse or direct the withdrawal of
the life-sustaining treatment. 64 The trial court found the conversation with her friend to be
sufficient evidence of Nancy's intent to no longer stay in her current state, and granted the
removal of the feeding tube. 65 The Supreme Court of Missouri overturned the trial court ruling
and held that a showing of Nancy's intent by clear and convincing evidence was required and
found that the evidence presented did not meet that standard. 66
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and in a five to four decision, affirmed the
Supreme Court of Missouri ruling. 67 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority. The Court
first focused on the common-law doctrine of battery and informed consent. 68 The right to
freedom from unwanted touching and bodily integrity body are "embodied in the requirement
that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment." 69 The Court went on to say,
"[t]he logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally has a
right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment."70 The Court "assumed" the "United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition."71

/d.
Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
65 /d.
66 /d. at 426.
67 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
68 /d. at 269.
63

64

69

/d.

70

/d.
/d.

71
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The Court went on to consider whether the United States Constitution forbid Missouri's
establishment of a heightened evidentiary requirement as to the incompetent patient's wishes
regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 72 The majority held that Missouri could
guard against potential abuses in this situation by requiring the surrogate to show "clear and
convincing" evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment. 73 The State could impose a heightened standard of proof to advance the important
State interests in (1) protecting and preserving human life; (2) safeguarding the "personal
element" of the choice between life and death; (3) maintaining procedural safeguards to ensure
accurate fact-finding in potentially adversarial proceedings; and (4) refusing to "make judgments
about the 'quality of life that a particular individual may enjoy." 74 The case was sent back to the
trial court.
The trial court concluded that the evidence met the clear and convincing standard and
once again determined that Nancy would not wish to be maintained in her current state and the
feeding tube was removed.
II. WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court addressed the constitutionality of Washington's
assisted suicide ban. 75 Plaintiffs argued that there is a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment that extends to the personal choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to
seek physician-assisted suicide. 76 The Ninth-Circuit Court of Appeals held that "a liberty
interest exists in the choice of how and when one dies, and that the provision of the Washington
statute banning assisted suicide, as applied to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten
72

73

/d. at 280.
/d. at 284.

74Jd. at 281-282.
75
76

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459 (WD Wash. 1994).
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their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their doctors, violates the Due Process
Clause." 77
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, answered the more general
question of "whether the 'liberty' interest specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes
a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so."78 The Court
held that the right to physician-assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause. 79 To find such a right, the Court would "have to reverse centuries of
legal doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy of almost every state." 80
Because there was no fundamental constitutional right to assisted suicide, Washington had to
demonstrate that the ban on assisted suicide was only "rationally related to legitimate
government interests." 81 The Court concluded that the ban was rationally related to the
legitimate governmental interests in: preservation of life, prevention of suicide, protecting the
integrity and ethics of the medical profession, and protecting vulnerable groups. 82 The Court
also pointed out the State's legitimate concern that assisted suicide could lead to voluntary and
involuntary euthanasia. 83
Justice Steven's concurred in the judgment. In the concurrence, Justice Steven's stated "I
do not however, foreclose the possibility that an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death,
or a doctor whose assistance was sought, could prevail on a more particularized challenge. " 84
Interestingly, in a footnote at the end of the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited
Justice Steven's statement and acknowledged, "Our opinion does not absolutely foreclose such a
77

Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996).
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
7 9 /d. at 728.
80 /d. at 723.
8 1 /d. at 728.
82 /d. at 728-732.
83 /d. at 732.
84 /d. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
78

12

claim." 85 He went on to say that the "claim would have to be quite different from the ones
advanced by respondents here. " 86 This leaves open the possibility that a particular patient's
interests with case-specific circumstances might outweigh the State's interests and prevail.
Although the Court unanimously held that there is no right to commit suicide, the
concurring opinions of Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Ginsberg, Stevens, and Souter indicate a
position that there is a right to adequate pain management and treatment.
Justice O'Connor explained that she joined the Court's majority opinion because she
agreed that there is no generalized right to commit suicide and the State's interests are
sufficiently weighty to justify the ban on assisted suicide. 87 She indicates that state legislatures
are the proper forum to "strike the proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally
competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the State's interests in
protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure." 88 Justice O'Connor
explains that the Court did not need to address the narrower question whether patients have a
"constitutionally cognizable interest in obtaining relief from the suffering that they may
experience in the last days of their lives" 89 because "there is no dispute that dying patients in
Washington and New York can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their
death." 90 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion suggests her belief that there is a right to avoid
great suffering.

85

/d. at 735, n. 24.

86

/d.

87
88

/d. at 736 (O'Connor,
/d.

89

/d.

90

/d. at 738.

J., concurring) .
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Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment. He agreed with the distinctions the majority
noted in causation and intent between terminating life-support and assisting in suicide. 91 Justice
Stevens explained that the Court holding that Washington's statute was not unconstitutional "on
its face" did not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the statute might be invalid. 92
He also addressed the statute in Vacco v. Quill and stated that the holding "does not foreclose the
possibility that

~orne

applications of the New York statute may impose an intolerable intrusion

on the patient's freedom. 93
Justice Souter concurred 1n the judgment. Justice Souter analogized the physicianassisted suicide cases and the abortion cases. Even though the State had a legitimate interest in
discouraging abortion and the decision to have an abortion can be made irresponsibly and under
the influence of others, the Court recognized a woman's right to a physician's assistance. 94
"Without physician assistance in abortion, the woman's right would have too often amounted to
nothing more than a right to self-mutilation, and without a physician to assist in the suicide of the
dying, a patient's right will often be confined to crude methods of causing death. " 95 He also
points out a reason that physician's assistance would fall into accepted traditional methods of
care would be the Court's recognition in Roe v. Wade, that the physician "is not just a mechanic
of the human body whose services have no bearing on a person's moral choice, but one who does
more than treat symptoms, one who ministers to the patient. " 96

91

/d. at 751 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments).

92

/d. at 739.

93

/d. at 751-752.

94

/d. at 778 (Souter. J., concurring in the judgment).

95

/d.
/d. at 779.

96
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Justice Ginsburg wrote a very brief concurrence stating that she concurred with the
judgments for substantially the same reasons as Justice O'Connor. 97
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment and agreed with the distinction between
physician assisted suicide and withdrawal of life support. 98

His concurring opinion indicates

that he a ban on terminal sedation unconstitutional. He agrees with Justice 0' Connor that a
successful claim would have to deal with avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with
death) and neither New York nor Washington force a dying person to undergo such pain as
neither of the laws "prohibit doctors from providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain
despite the risk that those drugs themselves will kill. " 99 If there were a "state law to prevent the
provision of palliative care, including the administration of drugs as needed to avoid pain at the
end of life ... the Court might have to revisit its conclusions." 100 Justice Breyer's concurrence
further supports the presumption that a state would not be able to ban the practice of terminal
sedation.
III. VACCO V. QUILL
In Vacco v. Quill, the Supreme Court addressed the New York ban on assisted suicide. 101
The plaintiffs in that case argued that the New York ban on assisted suicide violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 102 The basis of the plaintiffs' argument was
that New York law permits a competent person to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and
physician-assisted suicide is essentially the same as refusing life-sustaining treatment; thus,

/d. at 789 (Ginsburg. J., concurring).
Glucksberg 789-790.
99 /d. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgments).
100 /d. at 792.
1o1 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
1oz Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84-85 (SONY 1994).
97
98
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prohibiting physician-assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause. 103 The District Court
rejected the argument and stated that New York had legitimate interests in preserving life and
protecting vulnerable persons. 104 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the
basis that those on life support at the final stages of life could hasten their death by removing the
support whereas similarly situated people, who were not on life-sustaining treatment, were not
allowed to hasten their death. 105 The Court of Appeals found no rational relationship between
the ban and a legitimate state interest. 106
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the position that there is a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment and emphasized that it is based
on the traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching and denied the
proposition that there is a right to hasten death. 107
Chief Justice Rehnquist' s opinion drew a distinction between assisted suicide and
withdrawing life sustaining treatments.

"This Court has recognized, at least implicitly, the

distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die." 108 The majority opinion
stated that the "distinction comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and
intent." 109 "The law has long used actors' intent or purpose to distinguish between two acts that
may have the same result." 110 "When a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies
from an underlying fatal ·disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication
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prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication." 111 The majority stated that a
physician only intends to honor a patient's wish to cease or not to begin life-sustaining treatment
whereas a physician assisting a suicide "must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that
the patient be made dead." 112 The Court stated that the intent of the physician in the scenario of
removing life-sustaining treatment is the same as the intent "when a doctor provides aggressive
palliative care." 113 In a footnote in the Majority opinion, "Just as a State may prohibit assisting
suicide while permitting patients to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit
palliative care related to that refusal, which may · have the foreseen but unintended "double
effect" of hastening the patient's death." 114
In a brief concurring concurring opinion, Justice Souter stated "The reasons that led me
to conclude in Glucksberg that the prohibition on assisted suicide is not arbitrary under the due
process standard also support the distinction between assistance to suicide, which is banned, and
practices such as termination of life support and death-hastening pain medication, which are
permitted." 115
E. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
There are aspects of terminal sedation that people find to be problematic. It is argued that
terminal sedation is indistinguishable from euthanasia; that the practice is euthanasia in disguise.
Terminal sedation is not euthanasia. The main distinction is the physician's intent to relieve
suffering and not to cause death. Euthanasia involves the physician administering an agent
intended to facilitate death. Terminal sedation involves the physician administering an agent
intended to sedate the patient and relieve intractable suffering. When terminal sedation is
111
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combined with the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment, specifically artificial
nutrition and hydration, The issue is more problematic regarding terminal sedation combined
with withholding or withdrawing life sustaining treatment, specifically artificial nutrition and
hydration, the intent distinction becomes more problematic.

However, terminal sedation

involves the sedation of the patient to relieve suffering. Withholding or withdrawing of treatment
is a separate practice. As such, even though they may be used together, the decision to use
terminal sedation and the decision to withdraw or withhold nutrition and hydration must be
evaluated separately.

Terminal sedation combined with withholding and withdrawing life-

sustaining treatment is ethically permissible.
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT

In order for a physician to engage in terminal sedation, the physician must administer the
sedating medication with the intent to relieve pain and suffering, not to cause death, even though
death is a foreseeable risk. This is known as the principle of double effect. 116 The principle of
double effect provides guidelines to aid in deciding if a course of action is ethically
permissible. 117 The principle is a common justification for why terminal sedation is treated as
morally distinct from euthanasia.118 Under this rule, a foreseeable bad outcome is acceptable if
it is unintended and outweighed by an intentional good. 119 The principle of double effect has
four conditions: (1) the nature of the act must be "good" or morally neutral; (2) the actor must
intend the "good" effect, not the "bad" effect, but the "bad" effect may be foreseen; (3) the "bad"
effect must not be a means to the good effect; and (4) there must be proportionality between the
116
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intended "good" effect and the unintended but foreseen "bad" effect. 120 Proportionality is
determined based on the terminal condition of the patient, the urgent need to relieve suffering,
and the consent of the patient or proxy.121 The first condition determines whether the act is ever
permissible, the second and third conditions determine whether the potential harm is intentional
or unintentional, and the fourth condition compares the net good and bad effects to determine
which course produces an effect of proportionately greater value. 122
When applying the doctrine of double effect to terminal sedation, the "good" effect is
relief of suffering and the "bad" effect is death. If one assumes that a physician administering
sedative medicine to a patient to relieve pain is at least a "morally neutral" act and the situation is
one where relief of suffering outweighs the possibility of death, the conditions required by the
doctrine would be met if the physician administers the medication to the patient, intending only
to relieve suffering by sedating the patient. This theory is best applied when the patient is
terminally ill and does not have long to live because the further from death the patient is, the less
likely it would be that death would be seen as the better outcome.
One criticism of the doctrine of double effect is the heavy reliance on intent of the
physician, which can be difficult to judge. "The morality of everyday clinical practice depends
heavily on the concept of intention, and clinicians have an unarticulated, intuitive grasp of the
rule of double effect in almost all of their therapeutic interventions." 123 The physician's intent
may be inferred from the dose that is initially given and the process by which the dose is
increased. 124 In the medical field, proportionality requires that "the risk of causing harm bear a

120

Quill, Dresser & Brock, supra note 115; Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1812.
Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1812.
122 Quill, Dresser & Brock, supra note 115, at 1770.
123 Daniel P. Sulmasy & Edmund D. Pellegrino, The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing Up the Double Talk, 159
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 545, 548 (1999).
124 Lo & Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1812.
121

19

direct relationship to the danger and immediacy of the patient's clinical situation and the
expected benefit of the intervention." 125 If the initial dose is a lethal dose with no possibility for
symptoms to be relieved without the patient's death, this is closer to euthanasia and would not be
considered an acceptable practice of terminal sedation. The dose should only be increased if the
lower dose is ineffective. 126 The notion of proportionality is crucial to differentiate palliative
sedation from euthanasia. 127
Another criticism is that people are generally held accountable for consequences that they
foresee and not merely for those that they intend and so the doctrine of double effect is
inconsistent with societal norms regarding actions. 128 The understanding of moral responsibility
encourages people to act more carefully and holds people responsible for things under their
control. Physician's are often in the position of balancing risks and benefits. When a surgeon
undergoes a risky surgery to remove a brain tumor in a difficult area of the brain, the physician
knows that there is a chance that they can cause significant brain damage or death. However, the
benefit of removing the brain tumor in most cases would significantly outweigh the possibility of
death. In the medical field, foreseeable risks are common and physicians often have to weigh
their duty to relieve suffering and their duty to do no harm. In most of these scenarios, there are
foreseeable risks, but it is between the physician and the patient to determine the best course.
II. TERMINAL SEDATION VS. EUTHANASIA
Terminal sedation is ethically different than euthanasia. The main distinctions focus on
intention and proportionality. With euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, the primary
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intention is to cause the patient's death. On the other hand, terminal sedation requires that the
primary intention be to alleviate the patients suffering.
David Orentlicher, one of the first legal commentators on terminal sedation, argues that at
times, terminal sedation is "slow euthanasia" because the patient dies after a few hours or days
rather than immediately .129 Orentlicher argues that when terminal sedation is accompanied by the
withholding of nutrition and hydration, the patient dies as a result of active intervention on the
part of the physician. 130 "It is the physician-created state of consciousness that is responsible for
the patient's inability to eat, not the natural progression of the patient's underlying disease." 131
Orentlicher urges that the principle of double effect, as applied to terminal sedation in addition to
withholding nutrition and hydration, only justifies the act of sedation and not the withholding of
nutrition and hydration because starving and dehydrating the patient does not relieve suffering, it
brings on the patients death. 132
The decision to use terminal sedation must be made independent of the decision to reduce
or withhold artificial nutrition and hydration. 133 The main ethical issue is whether the patient or
surrogate consented to the withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration, not what caused the
patient not to eat. 134 If a patient shows signs of imminent death before sedation, it seems
unethical and irresponsible to hamper the natural dying process. In many cases it would also
seem futile. In most situations, candidates for terminal sedation will be near death and the
overriding goal of care is no longer to prolong survival, but to provide comfort and symptom
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relief. 135 Case law supports the refusal of life-sustaining treatment, including the ability to
forego hydration and nutrition. This right is likely not contingent upon whether the refusal is of
artificial nutrition and hydration or the patient election to discontinue eating and drinking. The
American Medical Association does not recognize an ethical distinction between withdrawing
and withholding life-sustaining treatment. 136 "Physicians have an obligation to relieve pain and
suffering and to promote the dignity and autonomy of dying patients in their care." 137
Withholding nutrition and hydration does not have to be supported by the principle of double
effect. If a competent patient, or a surrogate decision maker gives informed consent to forego
life-sustaining treatment, the physician must respect the patient's wishes.
Orentlicher also argues that relying on physician intent to distinguish terminal sedation
from euthanasia fails because the physician must intend for the patient to die considering no one
can survive for very long without nutrition and hydration. 138

Orentlicher distinguishes

withholding from withdrawal of treatment. He argues withdrawal is distinguishable from
euthanasia because the physician might reasonably believe that the patient will survive after
discontinuation and thus only intends to free the patient from unwanted treatment. 139 The
argument is not a strong one because the physician who withholds nutrition and hydration is only
respecting the patient's decision to decline life-sustaining treatment.

Physician intent is

irrelevant to the issue of withdrawing or withholding nutrition and hydration; "the operative
issue is whether it is within the individual patient's 'liberty interest' in making this decision." 140
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There is disagreement on the propriety of using terminal sedation when the patient is
suffering from psychological or emotional distress. There is a perception that death is hastened
because patients may live for many years with refractory depression. 141 It can be difficult to
distinguish and draw bright lines among the three major categories of symptoms identified in the
dying process: physical, psychological, and existential suffering. 142 Psychological symptoms
include depression, anxiety, fear, and delirium. 143 Existential suffering includes feelings of
meaninglessness, hopelessness and grief. 144
Existential pain is more difficult to access because evaluation requires special training
that a physician typically lacks and it also requires continual contact with patients' families. The
American Medical Association does not approve of terminal sedation to treat primarily
existential suffering. 145 Terminal sedation should not be used on patients who are primarily
experiencing psychological and existential suffering; there are other forms of treatment that
would be more beneficial to the patient.
III. ADDITIONAL CONCERNS
A few weeks after Mr. Oltzik's death, Mrs. Olztik still felt a bit uneasy. 146 She was very
upset that she did not get the chance to say goodbye to her husband. 147 Even so, she said that she
could not think of any other way to handle her husband's agitation and she does not regret the
decision. It is common for the family to be involved in the decision making process. 148
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Caregivers, family, and friends often have strong emotional reactions when a patient Is
experiencing severe distress; and it is important that the health care team provide emotional
support and to ensure that the family and patient or surrogate have the opportunity to think
through the complicated ethical issues.

There should be a plan of care that includes an

opportunities for the family to say good-bye and for religious ceremonies or consultations with
spiritual advisors.149 A study which reported on the experience of family members attitudes on
terminal sedation, found that fear of shortening a loved one's life, not being provided with
enough information, and physicians and nurses who lacked sufficient compassion, contributed to
dissatisfaction. 150
Clinicians are unlikely to be able to predict with sufficient accuracy the amount of time a
patient will live. 151 Additionally, there are arguments that terminal sedation hastens death by
shortening the patient's life. However, empirical studies have not shown an association between
increases in doses of sedatives during the last hours of life and decreases in survival. 152 There
are numerous reports in the literature that state, directly or indirectly, that there is an absence of
an impact of terminal sedation on survival duration. 153
When physicians are faced with a terminally ill patient with refractory symptoms, they
face a dilemma because two ethical guidelines conflict: to relieve the patient's suffering and not
to cause the patient's death.154 Studies have shown that more than half of physicians find the
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decision making process very difficult. 155 Proportionality can help the physician to overcome
this dilemma and find the appropriate balance.
F. CONCLUSION
It is common for terminally ill patients to receive sedatives and for symptom relief to be

achieved while the patient retain consciousness. 156 However, sometimes normal palliative
treatment is not enough to relieve the suffering and that is when terminal sedation becomes an
option.

Terminal sedation integrates 2 accepted clinical practices: (1) sedation to

unconsciousness or a level that ensures escape from intolerable suffering, and (2) withholding
life-sustaining therapy including food and fluids. 157
The Supreme Court has unanimously held that there is no constitutionally protected right
to physician-assisted death. However, the concurring opinions may be read as a warning to states
not to adopt statutes that would prohibit physicians from doing everything in their medical power
to prevent suffering. 158 The Court left the door open to challenges of physician-assisted suicide
without a clear articulation as to the type of claim that would succeed. Justices O'Connor and
Breyer indicated that patients in New York and Washington did not have barriers to obtaining
pain relief at the end of life and if such barriers existed the analysis would be different. If a state
were to ban the practice of terminal sedation, a claim that the ban is unconstitutional would
likely fit the type of challenge that would succeed.
For the principle of double effect to apply, the conditions that must be met are (1) the
action must be good or at least neutral; (2) the good effect and not the bad effect must be
intended; (3) the good effect must not be produced by means of the bad effect; and (4) there must
155
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be proportionately grave reason for permitting the bad effect. 159 Administering the medication is
at least neutral. The good effect is pain relief and the bad effect is death.

With terminal

sedation, the physician is intending to provide pain relief to their patient. Death is foreseeable,
but not intended.

The effect of relieving the pain is not met by death; it is met by the

medications. The patient living pain-free rather than suffering in the last days is sufficiently
grave to risk the already imminent death. If you add the withholding or withdrawing of nutrition
and hydration into the equation, and look at the sedation and the withholding/withdrawing as one
continuous step, the principle of double effect no longer justifies the action.
Withholding or withdrawing nutrition and hydration is not a part of terminal sedation.
The decision to withhold or withdraw nutrition needs to be considered separately from
consideration of terminal sedation. "The liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must
protect, if it protects anything, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical
treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water." 160 A patient may decline artificial
nutrition or hydration. As discussed above, the Supreme Court has implicitly approved the use
of terminal sedation. Terminal sedation can be morally justified by the principle of double
effect. Terminal sedation combined with the withholding or withdrawing of nutrition and
hydration is legal and distinct from euthanasia.
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